Fair Trade-mark: Proposing an Affirmative Duty on Licensors to Enforce Their Corporate Social Responsibility Codes by Newman, Dorothy L.
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 29 XXIX 
Number 2 Article 8 
2019 
Fair Trade-mark: Proposing an Affirmative Duty on Licensors to 
Enforce Their Corporate Social Responsibility Codes 
Dorothy L. Newman 
Fordham University School of Law, dnewman13@law.fordham.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dorothy L. Newman, Fair Trade-mark: Proposing an Affirmative Duty on Licensors to Enforce Their 
Corporate Social Responsibility Codes, 29 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 729 (2019). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol29/iss2/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Fair Trade-mark: Proposing an Affirmative Duty on Licensors to Enforce Their 
Corporate Social Responsibility Codes 
Cover Page Footnote 
Fordham University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, 2020; University of Pennsylvania, M.S. & B.A., 2017. I 
would like to thank Professor James Brudney for his invaluable guidance throughout the process of 
developing this Note, and Professor Janet Freilich for her crucial advice and thoughtful feedback. Thank 
you to Senior Research & Writing Editor Sean Corrado and the entire staff and editorial board of the 
Fordham IPLJ. Finally, I am grateful to my parents and family for their endless love and support. 
This note is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol29/iss2/8 
 729 
Fair Trade-mark: Proposing an 
Affirmative Duty on Licensors to 
Enforce Their Corporate Social 
Responsibility Codes 
Dorothy L. Newman* 
Modern consumers are increasingly interested in seeing the 
brands they love commit to corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
including fair labor practices and environmental sustainability 
throughout their supply chains. Many corporations capitalize on 
this demand through branding strategies that highlight their 
commitment to CSR. Branding of CSR can include publishing 
codes of conduct on corporate websites, incorporating a value of 
doing good while doing well in print and video advertisements, or 
even publicly partnering with nonprofit organizations. The 
Lanham Act, the primary federal trademark statute in the United 
States, articulates federal laws pertaining to branding and 
advertising, and is rooted in a significant policy interest to keep 
consumers informed and to prevent consumer deception. Two 
doctrines of law that stem from the Lanham Act substantiate this 
policy consideration: the naked licensing doctrine, which imposes 
an affirmative duty on trademark licensors to supervise their 
licensees’ quality control standards, and false advertising law, 
which prevents corporations from espousing false or misleading 
advertising in connection with their trademarks or brands. An 
analysis of each of these bodies of law, along with the overall 
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policy underpinnings of the Lanham Act, poses the concern that 
corporations who incorporate CSR into their branding strategies 
run the risk of deceiving consumers if in reality they do not 
supervise their supply chain sufficiently to ensure the truth of their 
public CSR statements. This Note analyzes the naked licensing 
doctrine and false advertising laws, and proposes an affirmative 
duty on corporations to monitor and enforce their CSR codes, in 
compliance with the Lanham Act. 
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  INTRODUCTION  
The average person in the United States is exposed to 
somewhere between 4000 and 10,000 advertisements every day.1 
Between food and beverages, entertainment and sports, toiletries 
and home goods, and just about everything else, industries are 
saturated with trademarks that catch the eye of the consumer at 
every turn of their day. Even before stepping foot outside of the 
house in the morning, a consumer is faced with trademarks on 
toothpaste tubes and mouthwash bottles, cereal boxes and milk 
cartons, clothing, jackets and shoes. When getting dressed in the 
morning a consumer will make conscious decisions based on 
trademarks: a die-hard fan might choose a t-shirt bearing her 
favorite team’s trademark on gameday, a nostalgic college 
graduate might choose a hoodie bearing his alma mater’s 
trademark for a run in the park, and a fashion-conscious consumer 
might choose an outfit bearing the trademarks of the most current, 
sought after brands. When riding the subway, a consumer will 
make subconscious associations with trademarks: both the banners 
across the top of the car’s interior and the people sitting across the 
car are covered with trademarks for food, apparel, service, and 
entertainment brands. 
Legally defined, a trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof— (1) used by a person . . . to 
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique 
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate 
the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”2 Over 
time, the role of trademarks has expanded. In 1916, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the “primary and proper function” 
of a trademark is to “identify the origin or ownership of the article 
to which it is affixed.”3 However, this function has evolved in a 
changing economy in which a trademark could indicate the source 
of a product, even if the exact origin is unknown.4 Trademarks 
 
1 Jon Simpson, Finding Brand Success in the Digital World, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2017, 
8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2017/08/25/finding-brand-
success-in-the-digital-world/#14048124626e [https://perma.cc/7Q9R-3KGX]. 
2 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
3 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916). 
4 See Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918). 
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today serve essentially two functions: (1) “the prevention of 
deception and consumer confusion,” and (2) “the protection of 
property interests in trademarks.”5 
While a company’s brand is inextricably linked to its 
trademark, strong branding expands well beyond the mark, and 
into the brand identity that the mark signifies to consumers.6 
Multinational corporations apportion a substantial amount of 
resources into their brand image,7 and consumers often associate 
brands with identities similar to those of human beings.8 Branding 
as a process of humanizing a corporation “shifts [consumer focus] 
away from things like labor practices and supply chains and onto 
issues of narrative and identity.”9 Nevertheless, many corporations 
have woven their labor practices and social responsibility 
initiatives into the fabric of their brand identities as part of their 
humanization efforts when constructing a brand image. Further, 
many multinational corporations have adopted written codes of 
conduct to publicly declare a commitment to upholding fair labor 
standards throughout their supply chains.10 However, enforcement 
of these ambitious corporate social responsibility objectives has 
proven difficult because the codes are not legally binding, and are 
often monitored and regulated by the corporation that wrote them, 
 
5 Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987). 
6 Dan Pallotta, A Logo is Not a Brand, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 15, 2011), 
https://hbr.org/2011/06/a-logo-is-not-a-brand [https://perma.cc/3CDA-RT7Y]. 
7 According to the CMO Report in 2016, marketing can account for up to nearly a 
quarter of a corporation’s overall budget, particularly in the consumer packaged goods 
industry. In the consumer services, tech software, and communications industries, the 
percentages ranged from 13%–15%. See Marketing Budgets Vary By Industry, WALL ST. 
J.: DELOITTE (Jan. 24, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://deloitte.wsj.com/cmo/2017/01/24/who-
has-the-biggest-marketing-budgets/ [https://perma.cc/8THU-VK86]. 
8 Amanda Hess, What Happens When People and Companies Are Both Just 
‘Brands’?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01
/magazine/what-happens-when-people-and-companies-are-both-just-brands.html 
[https://perma.cc/CK3R-RRNT] (“Wendy’s, which used to be personified by a little red-
haired girl or by its founder, Dave Thomas, is now personified by a social-media team 
renowned for its ability to tweet like a rude teenager.”). 
9 Id. 
10 James J. Brudney, Envisioning Enforcement of Freedom of Association Standards in 
Corporate Codes: A Journey for Sinbad or Sisyphus?, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 555, 
555 (2012). 
2019] FAIR TRADE-MARK 733 
 
despite conflicting interests to maximize profits and rise above 
competition in the market.11 
This Note focuses on the relationship between trademark law, 
consumer protection, and corporate social responsibility code 
enforcement. Part I provides an overview of the naked licensing 
doctrine in trademark law, which imposes an affirmative duty on 
trademark owners to supervise their licensees’ quality control 
standards, along with some of the scholarly and judicial resistance 
to the doctrine. Part II provides a brief history of corporate social 
responsibility, and analyzes past and present monitoring and 
enforcement practices along with some of the shortcomings of 
these efforts. Finally, Part III proposes a new private action by 
consumers as an additional mechanism for the enforcement of 
corporate social responsibility codes by drawing an analogy from 
the naked licensing doctrine and establishing an injury that 
consumers incur when brands do not uphold the promises made in 
their codes of conduct. 
I. THE NAKED LICENSING DOCTRINE 
A. Doctrine Overview 
Before the 1946 enactment of the Lanham Act, the primary 
trademark statute of the United States,12 the practice of licensing a 
trademark, or allowing an entity other than the trademark owner to 
bear the mark, constituted abandonment through which the 
trademark owner risked losing the exclusive right to the mark.13 
However, some courts found licensing to be valid so long as the 
licensor kept some control with regard to the quality of the 
products bearing its mark.14 The Lanham Act remained consistent 
with this latter view that licensing in and of itself does not 
constitute abandonment of a trademark, “but only if the licensor 
exercises control over the nature and quality of the goods and/or 
 
11 See id. at 556. 
12 See generally Lanham Act (Lanham Trade-Mark Act) (Trademark Act of 1946), 
Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified in scattered section of 15 U.S.C.). 
13 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959). 
14 Id. at 367. 
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services sold by the licensee under the licensed mark.”15 Thus, 
naked or unsupervised licensing can constitute an abandonment.16 
The need for licensor control over licensees stems from the 
purpose and function of trademarks. Since a trademark is intended 
to serve as a source of information for consumers, the source of 
information becomes compromised when licensees are free to use 
licensed trademarks with no quality control from licensors.17 Such 
a compromise poses a risk for consumer deception against which 
the Lanham Act seeks to protect.18 
There is no bright line rule that establishes a quality control 
standard for licensors under the Lanham Act, but several circuit 
courts have upheld some level of quality control.19 While the 
majority of courts have established a middle ground approach, 
some have fallen to either extreme with some decisions “extremely 
lenient . . . adopt[ing] an almost ‘laissez faire’ approach,” and 
other decisions “overly strict and too ready to strike down a mark 
for inadequate control over a licensee.”20 
In the Second Circuit’s decision in Dawn Donut v. Hart’s Food 
Stores, Inc., the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for 
trademark infringement, and the defendant asserted that the 
plaintiff’s trademark should be cancelled because the plaintiff 
engaged in naked licensing by “fail[ing] to exercise the control 
required by the Lanham Act over the nature and quality of the 
goods sold by its licensees.”21 The Dawn Donut court confirmed 
that the Lanham Act’s concept of trademark abandonment is the 
origin of an affirmative duty on trademark licensors to supervise 
their licensees22 and re-emphasized the public policy concerns of 
consumer deception in its naked licensing analysis. The court 
noted that if the licensor is “not compelled to take some reasonable 
 
15 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
18:38 (5th ed. 2019); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1055. 
16 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:48. 
17 Id. 
18 See generally Lanham Act. 
19 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:55. 
20 Id. 
21 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959). 
22 Id. 
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steps to prevent misuses of his trademark in the hands of others[,] 
the public will be deprived of its most effective protection against 
misleading uses of a trademark,” an effect that would run squarely 
in opposition to the Lanham Act.23 
In discussing the actual bar for naked licensing, Judge 
Lumbard, who authored the Dawn Donut opinion emphasized the 
need for evidence to prove a lack or existence of adequate 
supervision in compliance with the Lanham Act.24 For example, 
Judge Lumbard noted that the record from the district court did not 
clarify whether the plaintiff conducted regular and comprehensive 
inspections by qualified inspectors or whether it only sporadically 
checked in on licensees with no specific objective.25 According to 
Judge Lumbard, the latter would not suffice to satisfy the Lanham 
Act’s requirements.26 
The Fifth Circuit has taken a different approach than that of the 
Second Circuit. While the Fifth Circuit held that failure to exercise 
control would constitute an abandonment on the grounds that it is 
deceptive to the public, it is explicit in stating that it “do[es] not sit 
to assess the quality of products sold on the open market.”27 The 
Fifth Circuit therefore held that a party seeking to establish a 
forfeiture has a high burden of proving failure to supervise, and 
“[r]etention of a trademark requires only minimal quality 
control.”28 
In contrast, while the Ninth Circuit has also held the 
challenging party to a high standard of proof,29 it has found 
instances of naked licensing by assessing supervising practices 
 
23 Id. at 367. 
24 Id. at 368. 
25 Id. at 369. 
26 Id. 
27 Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th 
Cir. 1977). 
28 Id.; see also Am. Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 624–25 (5th Cir. 
1963). 
29 FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-E., 542 F.2d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 
1976)). 
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under a three-part test. The Ninth Circuit held in 
FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, that The Freecycle 
Network, an umbrella nonprofit organization that oversaw a 
number of independent chapters, engaged in naked licensing 
because it (1) did not retain express controls over licensees’ quality 
control measures, (2) did not have actual controls over licensees’ 
quality control measures, and (3) was unreasonable in relying on 
licensees’ quality control measures.30 
The Ninth Circuit in Freecycle did not specifically decide on 
an evidentiary standard because even when applying the higher 
standard of proof and assessing the facts in the light most favorable 
to the defendant, The Freecycle Network abandoned its trademark 
through naked licensing.31 The Ninth Circuit therefore looked to 
the three aforementioned factors to determine if naked licensing 
had occurred.32 
With regard to the first factor, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
absence of a contractual right would support a finding of naked 
licensing.33 Previously, some courts have held that if licensors hold 
a contractual right to supervise licensees, it is enough to negate a 
finding of naked licensing.34 However, according to the modern 
understanding of the naked licensing doctrine, “such cases miss the 
point that not only must there be a right to control, but that duty 
must be discharged by the licensor.”35 Likewise, the second factor 
becomes exceedingly probative to an inquiry into whether naked 
licensing has occurred regardless of the presence of a contractual 
right pursuant to the first factor. 
For this reason, courts utilizing the Ninth Circuit factors will 
look to the record to determine if actual supervision occurred, 
 
30 Id. at 512. 
31 Id. at 514–15. 
32 The factors being, (1) whether the trademark owner had a contractual right to control 
the mark, (2) whether the trademark owner actually controlled the nature and quality of 
the use of its mark, and (3) whether the trademark owner reasonably relied on a licensee 
to control the nature of the use of its mark. MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:55. 
33 FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d at 516. 
34 Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678, 680 (D. Mass. 1953); see Wolfies 
Rest., Inc. v. Lincoln Rest. Corp., 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 310, 1964 WL 8113, at *1 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 1964). 
35 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:56. 
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pursuant to the second factor.36 In Freecycle, the licensor asserted 
that they exercised actual control over their licensees because they 
had policies and etiquette for local chapters listed on their website, 
among other similar reasons.37 The court held, however, that none 
of these assertions constituted actual control because the Freecycle 
Network’s controls were neither enforced nor effective.38 
Finally, under the third prong, The Freecycle Network argued 
in Freecycle that even in the absence of actual control, it 
“justifiably relied on its member groups’ quality control 
measures.”39 The Second Circuit has commented on a similar 
argument of reliance, noting that it would be sufficient to negate a 
finding of naked licensing only “where there is a history of 
trouble-free manufacture and quality is not deficient, so as to 
provide a just basis for reliance on the licensee’s own quality 
control.”40 Additionally, however, the Ninth41 and Tenth Circuits42 
have held that while reliance on licensees’ quality control efforts is 
relevant, it is not enough to avoid a finding of naked licensing in 
the absence of other forms of actual periodic inspection or 
monitoring. 
The Ninth Circuit also held that if the licensor and licensee 
were involved in a “close working relationship,”43 the licensor 
would be able to rely on the licensee’s own quality control efforts 
and avoid a finding of naked licensing.44 An adequate relationship 
could be established in the following four circumstances: 
(1) a close working relationship for eight years; (2) 
a licensor who manufactured ninety percent of the 
components sold by a licensee and with whom it 
 
36 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:59. 
37 FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d at 517. 
38 Id. at 518. 
39 Id. 
40 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:57; see also Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich 
Pharmacal Co., 315 F. Supp. 45, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d on other grounds, 437 F.2d 
566 (2d Cir. 1971). 
41 See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017–18 
(9th Cir. 1985). 
42 See, e.g., Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 872 (10th Cir. 1995). 
43 Barcamerica Int’l USA Tr. v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 597 (9th Cir. 2002). 
44 FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d at 518; MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:57. 
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had a ten year association and knew of the 
licensee’s expertise; (3) siblings who were former 
business partners and enjoyed a seventeen-year 
business relationship; and (4) a licensor with a close 
working relationship with the licensee’s employees, 
and the pertinent agreement provided that the 
license would terminate if certain employees ceased 
to be affiliated with the licensee.45 
In addition, the Federal Circuit has adopted the preponderance 
of evidence standard46 while several district courts have utilized a 
clear and convincing evidence standard47 when inquiring into the 
presence of naked licensing practices. Despite the lack of a bright-
line rule, it is generally held that the party challenging a trademark 
has a high burden of proof when establishing that a licensor 
engaged in naked licensing,48 and evidence of actual control—the 
second of the Ninth Circuit’s three factors—is required from the 
party whose trademark is being challenged.49 
B. Shortcomings of the Naked Licensing Doctrine 
The affirmative duty to supervise that the naked licensing 
doctrine has imposed on licensors has been met with significant 
scrutiny. Pushback to the naked licensing doctrine has surfaced for 
several reasons, but three primary weaknesses in the doctrine are 
especially relevant. Scholars have criticized the naked licensing 
doctrine for (1) favoring unclean hands by serving only as a 
defense to claims of trademark infringement, and not as its own 
independent cause of action,50 (2) being inconsistent (and at times 
 
45 FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d at 518 (citing Barcamerica Int’l, 289 F.3d at 597). 
46 Cerveceria Centroamericana, S.A. v. Cerveceria India, Inc., 892 F.2d 1021, 1024 
(Fed. Cir. 1989). 
47 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 17:12. 
48 Id. § 18:48 (citing to courts that have held the challenging party to a clear and 
convincing evidence standard, and courts that have found evidence of a delay in 
supervision to be insufficient). 
49 See, e.g., FreecycleSunnyvale, 626 F.3d at 512 n.1. 
50 Rudolph J. Kuss, Comment, The Naked Licensing Doctrine Exposed: How Courts 
Interpret the Lanham Act to Require Licensors to Police Their Licensees & Why This 
Requirement Conflicts with Modern Licensing Realities & the Goals of Trademark Law, 
9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 361, 373 (2005). 
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seemingly unworkable) across varying business models utilized 
across the spectrum of entities that own lucrative trademarks,51 and 
(3) potentially hurting consumers with increased search costs 
because when a court finds an instance of naked licensing, the 
original owner loses the trademark, the infringer may continue 
using it, and consumers are left having to “deal with infinite 
deceptive users of a trademark instead of one.”52 
The first two weaknesses in the naked licensing doctrine do not 
negate the doctrine’s public policy purpose, which is to protect 
against consumer deception. These two weaknesses may open a 
discussion about a need for more flexibility in the standard, but 
they do not point to a weakness or shortcoming of the consumer 
protection policy entrenched within the naked licensing doctrine, 
the Lanham Act, and trademark law at large. Further, the potential 
harms of the third weakness must be balanced against the same 
danger of potential harm to consumers that would be present if 
there was no policing requirement. In the latter instance, the same 
dangers of increased search costs and “infinite deceptive users,” 
would be present but without the incentive to police that is built 
into the naked licensing doctrine. 
A closer analysis of each of the three main weaknesses of the 
naked licensing doctrine will be useful in understanding why these 
weaknesses do not negate the fundamental policy underpinnings of 
the doctrine. 
First, scholars have criticized the naked licensing doctrine for 
favoring the unclean hands of a potential trademark infringer 
because the current procedural mechanism of the doctrine allows it 
to be asserted as a defense to an infringement claim, not an 
independent cause of action.53 However, this criticism leaves room 
for a proposed change to the doctrine that maintains the doctrine’s 
policy objectives but shifts the power of litigation to another party. 
Such an extension of the naked licensing doctrine from an 
 
51 Kevin Parks, “Naked” Is Not A Four-Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the 
“Quality Control Requirement” in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 536 
(1992). 
52 Kuss, supra note 50, at 373. 
53 Id. 
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affirmative defense to an independent cause of action seems to be 
within reason, particularly when compared to other causes of 
action that licensors can be subjected to for failing to complete 
their duty to supervise licensees. For example, the “[f]ailure to 
reasonably control a licensee may . . . render the licensor liable to 
charges of false advertising if the licensee has used the trademark 
as an instrument to defraud the public.”54 Additionally, the 
affirmative duty to supervise licensees can extend to hold licensors 
liable for the torts of licensees.55 While the tort liability of 
licensors typically refers to personal injury or property damage 
resulting from the licensed products,56 a combination of these 
above mentioned theories and their underlying policy objectives 
may give rise to a new procedural mechanism for the naked 
licensing doctrine that involves an independent cause of action and 
alleviates this criticism of the doctrine. 
Second, scholars have criticized the naked licensing doctrine 
for its inconsistency (and sometimes unworkability) across 
business models.57 The Seventh Circuit noted in Eva’s Bridal Ltd. 
v. Halanick Enterprises, Inc., “[h]ow much authority [from a 
licensor over a licensee] is enough can’t be answered generally; the 
nature of the business, and the customers’ expectations, both 
matter.”58 This is because for certain business models, neither the 
 
54 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:48 (citing Waltham Watch Co. v. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1963); Scotch Whiskey Ass’n v. Barton Distilling Co., 
338 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 
1973)). 
55 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:74 (citing Kennedy v. Guess, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 776, 
786 (Ind. 2004) (“[T]rademark licensors have a duty under the Lanham Act to take 
reasonable measures to detect and prevent misleading or deceptive uses of the 
trademark . . . They are thus likely to take some ongoing role in the products bearing their 
mark lest they risk loss of the right associated with ownership of it.”); Burkert v. Petrol 
Plus of Naugatuck, Inc., 579 A.2d 26 (Conn. 1990) (the naked licensing case law does 
not “suggest, in any way, that a trademark owner’s failure to exercise control subjects the 
owner to affirmative liability in tort for damages caused by a defective product bearing its 
trademark.”)). 
56 Id. 
57 Parks, supra note 51, at 536. 
58 Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enters., 639 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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nature of the business nor the expectations of the customers line up 
with the current state of the naked licensing doctrine.59 
In merchandising, for example, consumer expectations may not 
be about an established link between the trademark and its source 
but rather an established link between the trademark and a team or 
character that the customer identifies with.60 Additionally, in these 
instances, the nature of the business model does not lend itself to 
the policing mechanism under the naked licensing doctrine which 
expects the licensor to set a standard of product quality and then 
supervise licensees to ensure that their licensed products have 
conformed to that standard of quality.61 However, in 
merchandising, thousands of t-shirt companies, whose shirts fall 
onto a wide spectrum of quality and price, may be licensees of a 
sports team logo or movie character.62 If courts require all of a 
sports team’s licensees to have a regular quality standard, they 
would have to determine which t-shirt should set the standard.63 
However, the “quality of a [team] jersey cannot be measured 
against standards established by the trademark owner because the 
trademark owner’s product is entertainment. Therefore, a court 
would have to use the licensee’s quality as a benchmark, and this 
poses a problem when a trademark owner has hundreds or 
thousands of licensees.”64 
Like the first criticism of the naked licensing doctrine, this 
second criticism of inconsistency or unworkability zooms in on a 
need for a slightly more flexible standard of control, because 
control that is sufficient to prevent consumer deception may look 
different when an apparel brand like Nike licenses its trademark 
than when an entertainment brand like The Walt Disney Company 
does so.65 
 
59 Kuss, supra note 50, at 376. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 377. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 “Control that is satisfactory for the license of a children’s television program 
character on a plush doll toy will probably be much less than the extensive regulation 
system needed for the license of a famous mark on a system of quick-service food 
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Even if a more flexible standard is necessary to be workable in 
certain contexts, some standard of control is imperative to ensure 
that consumer expectations are met and consumers are not 
deceived.66 While it is true that a sports team’s product is 
entertainment, and therefore, the brand has not established a 
quality standard for apparel to which licensees should conform, the 
brand has still established a reputation and brand value. Thus, a 
reasonable consumer would likely have the expectation that a piece 
of apparel bearing the team’s trademark would be of a certain 
quality that is consistent with the trademark’s overall value, as 
opposed to a counterfeit which is assumed to be of lower quality. 
A more flexible standard should accommodate the nuanced arena 
of the industry, while both maintaining the policy underpinnings of 
the doctrine and being realistic about consumer expectations of 
licensed products. 
Finally, scholars fear that the naked licensing doctrine runs the 
risk of backfiring and hurting consumers with the burden of 
increased search costs.67 However, as aforementioned, this danger 
must be considered in conjunction with the danger that would be 
caused if the entire control requirement was abolished. This final 
criticism of the naked licensing doctrine poses the concern that the 
doctrine can result in the very outcome it seeks to protect against. 
But this is a tenuous argument; it suggests that if a standard is 
imperfect, it can’t be good. However, the naked licensing doctrine 
serves as an incentive to trademark holders to police their 
licensees.68 While it is true that licensors that fail to adequately 
police their licensees will lose their trademark and an indefinite 
amount of entities would be able to then use the mark, the point is 
moot because in that instance the mark at issue will no longer be a 
registered trademark.69 The lack of a registered mark will be a 
source of information to consumers to part with previous 
associations they may have made with it. On the other hand, with 
 
restaurants . . . [i]n general, the scope of quality control must be commensurate with the 
scope of uses of the mark permitted in the license.” MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:55. 
66 Id. 
67 Kuss, supra note 50, at 373. 
68 See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:48. 
69 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012). 
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no control requirement at all, there will be a registered trademark 
that is being misused. The latter poses a greater danger of 
consumer confusion and deception. 
Consumer protection is a fundamental tenet of the Lanham Act 
which specifically carves out the instances in which a trademark 
registration can be cancelled for losing its significance as an 
accurate source of information for consumers.70 At its heart, the 
naked licensing doctrine is a consumer protection measure that is 
consistent with this objective of the Lanham Act.71 The affirmative 
duty to supervise the quality standards of licensees ensures that 
consumers will not risk purchasing goods of a lesser quality than 
the trademark denotes, and that consumers will not have to endure 
burdensome search costs to make informed decisions about the 
products they are buying.72 Despite a potential need for more 
flexibility and/or an updated procedural mechanism, to uphold the 
significant purpose of the Lanham Act, the naked licensing 
doctrine’s underlying policy must be protected. 
II. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A. CSR Overview 
Multinational corporations have been incorporating codes of 
conduct into their business models to indicate their commitment to 
workers’ rights since the 1970s.73 In 1996, Kathie Lee Gifford was 
in tears on her show Live with Regis and Kathie Lee, coming to her 
own defense after the National Labor Committee, an NGO now 
known as the Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights, 
announced that her clothing line, which was sold in Wal-Mart 
stores, had used child labor and sweatshops.74 Crying on national 
 
70 Id. 
71 Daniel Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1759, 1767 (2006). 
72 Id. at 1767–68. 
73 Brudney, supra note 10, at 555. 
74 James Epstein-Reeves, The Parents of CSR: Nike and Kathie Lee Gifford, FORBES: 
CSR BLOG (June 8, 2010, 10:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2010/06/08/the-
parents-of-csr-nike-and-kathie-lee-gifford/#d889a6f416f5 [https://perma.cc/WY99-
F778]. 
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television, Gifford insisted that the accusations were not true.75 In 
the same year, Life magazine published heart-wrenching photos of 
children in Pakistan sewing soccer balls for Nike.76 Both scandals 
essentially started the conversation about corporate social 
responsibility as it is known today77: a written set of standards that 
has become prevalent in multinational corporations across almost 
every industry.78 While existence of these codes has become 
ubiquitous, monitoring and enforcing corporate social 
responsibility codes remains a pressing unanswered question. 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Codes vary amongst 
corporations, but in 2012 about one quarter of them explicitly 
referred to the International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions 
that address Freedom of Association.79 For example, the “Nestlé 
Corporate Business Principles” is an eighteen-page document 
authored by the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, and 
addressed to all employees.80 Nestlé’s Principles invoke ten 
distinct categories of business operations that will be regulated, of 
which number four is “human rights and labour practices” in which 
the United Nations Global Compact’s Guiding Principles on 
Human Rights and Labour (UN Guiding Principles) are invoked.81 
The UN Guiding Principles were promulgated in 2011 in an 
effort to publish a UN-certified statement in support of the 
enforcement of international labor rights through a “Protect, 
Respect, and Remedy” framework in which States have a duty to 
protect human rights, corporations have a responsibility to respect 
human rights, and victims of violations have access to appropriate 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g., The Nestlé Corporate Business Principles, NESTLÉ (June 2010), 
http://www.nestle.com/asset-library/documents/library/documents/corporate_governance
/corporate-business-principles-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMC2-7KML] [hereinafter 
Nestlé]. 
79 Brudney, supra note 10, at 559. 
80 NESTLÉ, supra note 78, at 3. 
81 Id. at 2. 
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remedies.82 The Guiding Principles are not legally binding: an 
early page includes a disclaimer stating “[n]othing in this Guiding 
Principles should be read as creating new international law 
obligations, or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a 
State may have undertaken or be subject to under international law 
with regard to human rights.”83 Rather, the Guiding Principles 
provide a framework that allows interested States and corporations 
to adhere to a set of standards endorsed by the UN when 
implementing CSR efforts.84 
Within the Guiding Principles, the language that addresses 
States as opposed to the language that addresses corporations 
differs substantially. States, for example, have a duty85 and 
corporations have a responsibility.86 However, the responsibility of 
corporations, as written, is not inconsequential. When addressing 
the responsibility of corporations, the Guiding Principles reference 
“at a minimum . . . those expressed in the International Bill of 
Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set 
out in the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.”87 Further, the 
Guiding Principles are intended to apply to “all enterprises 
regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and 
structure.”88 
Finally, while legal enforceability is absent from the Guiding 
Principles, the third pillar of the framework outlines the ways in 
which States can ensure access to remedy for victims of labor 
violations, recognizing that “[s]tates must take appropriate steps to 
ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other 
appropriate means, that when such abuses occur within their 
 
82 U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents
/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9DF-GNDC]. 
83 Id. at 1. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 4. 
86 Id. at 13. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 15. 
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territory and/or jurisdictions those affected have access to effective 
remedy.”89 
ILO Conventions 87, 138, and 182 are also explicitly 
referenced in the Nestlé Corporate Business Principles.90 
Convention 87 covers Freedom of Association (FOA) and the 
Right to Organize, and has been ratified by 155 countries.91 The 
United States is among the countries that have not ratified, along 
with several other developed countries including New Zealand and 
Singapore, as well as China and India.92 Convention 138 covers the 
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, and has been 
ratified by 171 countries, of which the United States is not one.93 
And Convention 182 addresses the Worst Forms of Child Labor, 
and has been ratified by 182 countries including the United 
States.94 
B. Past and Present Self-Monitoring and Enforcement 
Mechanisms 
Some CSR codes explicitly mention their monitoring process. 
Hasbro, for example, has a clause in its written code titled 
“Monitoring and Right to Terminate,” in which it outlines its right 
to terminate relationships with subcontractors and licensees after 
conducting “periodic on-site visits of working and living 
conditions, including unannounced audits of production records” 
and requiring “implementation of an acceptable written corrective 
action plan” that has not been adhered to.95 Others make no 
mention of their monitoring or enforcement plans. The Nestlé 
Corporate Business Principles do not make reference to monitoring 
 
89 Id. at 27. 
90 NESTLÉ, supra note 78, at 9. 
91 Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17. 
92 Id. 
93 Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 
June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297. 
94 Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161. 
95 Global Business Ethics Principles, HASBRO CORP. SOC. RESP., https://csr.hasbro.com
/en-us/csr/global-business-ethics-principles [https://perma.cc/KFA7-X5CC] (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2019). 
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or enforcement mechanisms; rather, the Principles utilize platitudes 
such as “support,” “respect,” and “uphold.”96 Any forms of 
monitoring or enforcing corporate codes that are in place, are for 
the most part internal and self-regulated.97 Corporations have 
created human rights or CSR divisions to conduct site visits and 
interviews, review complaints, and recommend proper corrective 
actions.98 However, this form of regulation can pose a number of 
problems, particularly when dealing with a multinational 
corporation that has an intricate net of global suppliers, licensees, 
and contractors, with limited transparency as to the labor 
conditions of those entities.99 
Additionally, self-regulation in and of itself is a problematic 
mode of enforcing a CSR code. At the outset, corporations face the 
tension between their desire to uphold human rights principles and 
their desire (and in some ways their fiduciary duty) to maximize 
profits and obtain competitive advantages in the market.100 Further, 
certain monitoring measures are not carried out in the most 
effective manner. Worksite visits, for example, are often 
announced ahead of time, giving the people in charge of the 
factory under scrutiny notice to draw up a second set of books to 
present auditors with, and to train employees with the script of 
what they should say in their interviews.101 
Corporations can get around their own internal conflicts of 
interest (to maximize profits while upholding fair labor practices) 
by engaging third party auditors such as workers’ rights nonprofit 
organizations. For example, the Fair Labor Association (FLA) is 
an international organization that brings together universities, 
organizations, and corporations in a collective effort to protect 
workers’ rights around the world.102 FLA’s methodology expands 
 
96 NESTLÉ, supra note 78, passim. 
97 Brudney, supra note 10, at 556. 
98 Id. at 570. 
99 Id. at 569. 
100 Id. at 571; Owen E. Herrnstadt, Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct: What’s 
Missing?, 16 LAB. LAW. 349, 361 (2001). 
101 Brudney, supra note 10, at 570. 
102 About Us, FAIR LAB. ASS’N, http://www.fairlabor.org/about-us [https://perma.cc
/N7FB-GYP6] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
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beyond conventional audits in response to complaints, which tend 
only to succeed in “protecting workers from the most egregious 
violations of labor rights.”103 In contrast, FLA conducts regular 
audits in an effort to prevent recurring violations and cultivate 
sustainable change in workplaces around the world.104 FLA 
compares its auditing work to that of an emergency room: 
“Auditing is like seeking urgent care at an emergency room. The 
doctor might ask your symptoms based on a checklist and 
prescribe pills that will make the pain or fever go away. Three 
weeks later, however, the same pain might return, and you’re right 
back in the emergency room.”105 In this way, FLA views auditing 
as an ongoing and iterative process of learning and understanding 
the scope of a workplace environment rather than a snapshot on 
one particular day.106 
However, even external auditors have been criticized for not 
being implemented effectively.107 This is because corporations 
have used monitors without the requisite experience or knowledge 
of labor standards.108 Furthermore, the actual audits may be 
ineffective if they are conducted in a way that makes it unlikely for 
a worker to trust the auditor.109 
Third-party auditors have also come into conflict with the 
various stakeholders involved in their operations. For example, the 
Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) is another independent labor 
rights monitoring organization that conducts in-depth workplace 
visits and investigations.110 In 2017, just after the NCAA March 
Madness tournament came to a close, Nike began blocking WRC’s 
 
103 Our Methodology, FAIR LAB. ASS’N, http://www.fairlabor.org/our-methodology 
[https://perma.cc/YAZ2-FQNP] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Herrnstadt, supra note 100, at 361. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 360; Brudney, supra note 10, at 570. 
110 WORKER RTS. CONSORTIUM, https://www.workersrights.org/ [https://perma.cc
/KE7W-99RM] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). The Worker Rights Consortium typically 
audits only in response to “fire alarms,” or reports of misconduct. Id. This is distinct from 
FLA’s regular audit methodology because WRC “puts out fires” whereas FLA prevents 
them. Id. 
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access to its suppliers’ factories.111 Despite over 150 organized 
protests from the United Students Against Sweatshops, Nike 
“would rather narrow the information it considers than keep an 
open channel for workers’ rights.”112 This move was a dangerous 
step backwards for Nike’s human rights efforts, cutting life-saving 
communication lines for workers.113 The decision was also 
surprising, because in the wake of the Rana Plaza factory collapse 
that killed 1134 workers in Bangladesh in 2013, corporations have 
been taking a better look at their supply chains.114 The increase in 
supply chain monitoring occurred especially because reports from 
survivors of the Bangladesh tragedy shed a light on workers’ 
voices being suppressed despite reports of begging not to work in 
an obviously dangerous situation.115 
The conversation didn’t end there, however. Universities, 
perhaps the most influential stakeholders in the WRC’s efforts, 
responded to Nike’s practices.116 Georgetown ended its contract 
with Nike altogether, until announcing a new deal that was the 
product of intense negotiations.117 The negotiations for 
Georgetown’s new deal with Nike were led by mediation expert, 
Don Edwards, who mediated between the three stakeholders, 
Georgetown, Nike, and WRC.118 Among several demands, Nike 
insisted that WRC keep findings from investigations confidential 
while Nike was given an appropriate amount of time to 
remediate.119 On the other hand, the deal required Nike to abide by 
labor standards set by IMG College Licensing, a group involved in 
 
111 Judy Gearhart, The Real March Madness: Nike Ditches University Commitments, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2017, 1:03 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-
real-march-madness-nike-ditches-university-commitments_us
_58deba30e4b0d804fbbb72b7 [https://perma.cc/MU68-L9PA]. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Elizabeth Segran, Here’s How Georgetown Convinced Nike to Make a Major 
Concession on Workers’ Rights, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 30, 2017), https://
www.fastcompany.com/40460462/heres-how-georgetown-convinced-nike-to-make-a-
major-concession-on-workers-rights [https://perma.cc/28M9-ET9N]. 
117 Id. 
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managing university licensing agreements.120 While a number of 
universities have had codes of conduct specifically for their 
licensees, Nike found this to be untenable.121 With the new model, 
IMG could put out a universal set of standards that all universities 
could adopt.122 Experts feared that IMG might not be the right 
body for this responsibility, but WRC has found the code to be 
effective.123 Ultimately, this new deal can serve as a model for 
other universities working through licensing agreements with 
major brands that operate through subcontractors and suppliers all 
over the world.124 In this way, Georgetown felt it was especially 
important to negotiate a new deal rather than terminate a 
relationship entirely, because the former tactic gave Georgetown 
actual leverage to make some change.125 
However, another major hurdle to self-enforcement or even 
enforcement by independent third parties, is the intricate nature of 
multinational corporations’ supply chains.126 First, multinational 
corporations often work with a large number of subcontractors, and 
constantly shift between suppliers.127 Corporations often state that 
they do not even have the knowledge of where a large amount of 
their products are manufactured as a product of this supply chain 
model.128 Further, factories often employ workers on short-term 
contracts called, in Cambodia, “fixed-duration contracts.”129 
Studies of the shift to fixed-duration contracts have brought to light 
 
120 Id. According to the Labor Code on IMG’s website, the organization requires 
licensees to adopt standards that “meet or exceed those established by the institutions, the 
FLA, and/or the WRC,” among several other requirements. See Labor Code, IMG C. 
LICENSING, http://www.imgcollegelicensing.com/Resources/Labor-Code.aspx [https://
perma.cc/FC5U-ENV9] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
121 Segran, supra note 116. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Brudney, supra note 10, at 572; Herrnstadt, supra note 100, at 363. 
127 Brudney, supra note 10, at 572. 
128 Id.; Herrnstadt, supra note 100, at 359. 
129 ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, TEARING APART AT THE 
SEAMS: HOW WIDESPREAD USE OF FIXED-DURATION CONTRACTS THREATENS CAMBODIAN 
WORKERS AND THE CAMBODIAN GARMENT INDUSTRY, https://law.yale.edu/system/files
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[https://perma.cc/5XPB-JFC6] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
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an increase in worker insecurity as well as a serious threat to 
worker rights enforcement under both domestic and international 
law.130 
While it is hard to believe in this day and age, when 
corporations are the most sophisticated that they have ever been in 
terms of their access to knowledge and data, even corporations that 
do have the knowledge of where and by whom their products are 
being manufactured, have limited leverage over these suppliers.131 
Often multinational corporations outsource work to hundreds or 
thousands of facilities, and their work within those facilities may 
only make up about 10% of the work done at that factory.132 With 
that in mind, a corporation threatening to terminate a relationship 
with a supplier may have compromised leverage over a supplier 
that has strong relationships intact with the corporations that 
comprise the other 90% of its output.133 
C. Private Causes of Action as an Enforcement Tool 
While the Federal Trade Commission has enforcement 
authority against corporations that advertise falsely or deceptively, 
there is no private right of action on behalf of consumers.134 
Private causes of action can provide another method of enforcing 
CSR codes.135 There are several options for private actions, and 
while each comes with the drawbacks associated with litigation, 
namely burden, cost, and risk, each also introduces a unique 
avenue to judicial enforcement of CSR codes.136 
An essential inquiry when assessing the validity of any private 
cause of action is standing, because in order to successfully bring a 
cause of action against a multinational corporation for failure to 
enforce a corporate social responsibility code, the plaintiff would 
 
130 Id. at 2. 
131 Brudney, supra note 10, at 572. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 572–73. 
134 See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law 
Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (last updated July 2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/883F-
MKS4]. 
135 See Brudney, supra note 10, at 574. 
136 Id. at 575. 
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need to prove that she has been injured as a result of 
noncompliance.137 To have standing to bring a lawsuit a party must 
satisfy the three-part test established by the Supreme Court in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered 
an injury in fact which is concrete and particularized and actual or 
imminent, (2) there must be causation between the injury and the 
action before the court, and (3) it must be likely that a favorable 
decision by the court will redress the injury.138 Within this 
framework, pinpointing a specific injury that is capable of being 
redressed by a favorable decision is among the biggest hurdles to 
the private cause of action method. With a finding of standing, 
private causes of action have been considered on behalf of 
employees and investors,139 as well as consumers. The false 
advertising action brought on behalf of consumers is most relevant 
to this Note. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court dismissed the case, Nike, Inc. v. 
Kasky, on jurisdictional grounds.140 However, the decision, which 
was originally tried in a state court in California, can teach scholars 
a lot about the potential viability of such a claim. The claim was 
brought by consumers against Nike, stating that “communications 
Nike made to customers, newspaper editors, college presidents and 
athletic directors, and others responding to allegations that Nike 
had engaged in, or was complicit in, the mistreatment of foreign 
workers . . . contained significant misstatements of fact . . . 
actionable under California’s unfair competition and false 
advertising laws.”141 California’s unfair competition law provides, 
 
137 See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
138 Id. at 560–61. 
139 Causes of action have been explored on behalf of employees based on, (1) the 
Employee Handbook Doctrine, (2) the Third-Party Beneficiary Doctrine, and (3) the 
Alien Tort Claims Act. Examples of causes of action on behalf of investors could be 
brought under, (1) rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (2) the 
Caremark decision in which shareholders argued that a corporation was liable for its 
board of directors’ failure to actively monitor corporate performance. See Brudney, supra 
note 10, at 576–83, 586–92; Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2018); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
140 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 661–63 (2003). 
141 David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1049–50 (2004). 
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in relevant part, that “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business 
act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 
advertising,” shall constitute unfair competition.142 
Nike’s response to the allegations that their statements were 
actionable under false advertising laws was that even if their 
statements had been false, they were entirely protected under the 
First Amendment because they were part of an ongoing debate 
about the general conversation surrounding the labor practices of 
multinational corporations.143 The California Supreme Court, in a 
split decision, ultimately rejected Nike’s theory.144 The United 
States Supreme Court agreed to review Nike’s First Amendment 
claims, but ultimately dismissed the case, leaving Nike’s First 
Amendment assertions unanswered.145 
To assess the likelihood of success in a future private action on 
false advertising grounds, an analysis and overview of the 
commercial speech doctrine is necessary. Prior to a series of cases 
culminating in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council Inc., the Supreme Court did not 
consider commercial speech to be protected under the First 
Amendment.146 Virginia Pharmacy involved a challenge to a law 
that prohibited the advertisement of drug prices.147 The Court 
presented three rationales for protecting commercial speech under 
the constitution: (1) consumers have an interest in accessing the 
information at issue, (2) commercial speech has the power to 
ensure that consumers are all able to make informed purchase 
decisions with all the relevant information, and (3) in general, the 
free flow of commercial information can contribute to the public 
interest in informed decision making.148 The Court’s reasoning 
played into a theme that “commercial speech is valued because of 
 
142 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2019). 
143 Vladeck, supra note 141, at 1050. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO. L.J. 
497, 503 (2015). 
147 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
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its ability to communicate useful information to consumers and to 
help them make more informed choices.”149 Importantly, under this 
notion, “only truthful, nonmisleading speech is constitutionally 
protected.”150 
The Supreme Court refined Virginia Pharmacy in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York by devising a four part test for evaluating the 
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech: (1) whether 
the speech concerns a lawful activity; if not, it may be suppressed 
outright; (2) whether the asserted governmental interest is 
substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the 
asserted governmental interest; and (4) whether the regulation is 
more extensive than necessary.151 This test has been the subject of 
serious criticism, however, both for being overly broad and for 
being supported by little more than policy.152 
Criticism of the commercial speech doctrine has attacked both 
its substance and its breadth.153 The substantive argument is that 
the commercial speech doctrine gives the government too much 
power to suppress commercial speech, and that the Court should be 
far stricter in only upholding regulations that are narrowly tailored 
to protect important government interests.154 However, less strict 
review would be justified when the Court is handling speech that is 
being regulated for its “misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales 
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Restricted Nike’s First Amendment Rights in Holding That Its Public Statements Were 
Commercial Speech, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 283, 302 (2004) (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“I share Justice 
Thomas’s discomfort with the Central Hudson test, which seems to me to have nothing 
more than policy intuition to support it.”)). 
153 Vladeck, supra note 141, at 1055. 
154 Id. 
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practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer 
information.”155 
The breadth arguments to the commercial speech 
doctrine contend that there is often no meaningful 
way to differentiate between commercial and 
noncommercial speech . . . [and] the test the Court 
has devised for determining whether speech is 
commercial—namely, whether it proposes a 
commercial transaction—is unworkable because 
often the line between commercial speech on the 
one hand and artistic, social, and political 
expression on the other is at best indistinct and at 
worst illusory.156 
This argument is relevant to the murky waters of Nike v. Kasky, in 
which Nike’s argument was rooted in the characterization of the 
speech at issue, as political expression, and Kasky’s argument was 
rooted in the characterization of that same speech as commercial 
speech, aimed at consumers and other stakeholders.157 Rather than 
arguing that false statements deserved constitutional protection, 
Nike strategically contended that the speech was not commercial 
speech.158 In this way, Nike was able to make an additional 
argument that “because its speech concerned matters of public 
importance, liability could be imposed only if the plaintiff could 
surmount the New York Times159 public figure standard—that is, 
prove that Nike’s statements were made with knowledge of falsity, 
or with reckless disregard for truth or falsity.”160 
The blurred lines between commercial and non-commercial 
speech present another obstacle to successfully bringing a private 
action on this theory, because it gives corporations a useful defense 
to allegations. In Kasky, the speech at issue, regardless of an 
arbitrary classification, impacted business transactions. For many 
consumers, Nike’s labor practices carry weight in purchase 
 
155 Id. at 1057. 
156 Id. at 1060. 
157 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 657 (2003). 
158 See id. at 659–60. 
159 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
160 Vladeck, supra note 141, at 1061. 
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decision making, as one of several factors including price, design, 
etc.161 Despite this nexus between the speech at issue and purchase 
decisions, Nike’s theory has a dangerously damaging effect on any 
false advertising claim, because “under Nike’s theory, sellers could 
make false claims about these characteristics but nonetheless 
escape liability by characterizing their statements as ‘core’ speech 
about matters of social and political importance.”162 
However, despite these obstacles, viability for false advertising 
claims can be found in case history regarding apparel and other 
manufactured goods companies that printed “Made in the U.S.A.” 
labels.163 Despite the fact that the country of origin of apparel 
could be deemed a political issue, that speech has been regulated, 
and the regulation upheld in instances where the label was 
discovered to be misleading or entirely false.164 In Colgan v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., the court cites Kasky in noting that 
false advertising laws can be extended not only to speech that is in 
fact false but speech that “has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to 
deceive or confuse the public.”165 
III. PROPOSING A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION THAT COMBINES 
NAKED LICENSING AND FALSE ADVERTISING PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY OBJECTIVES 
In this section, this Note proposes a new cause of action on 
behalf of consumers that rests on a theory combining some of the 
legal and policy underpinnings of both naked licensing and false 
advertising. Through this independent cause of action, consumers 
will be able to file a lawsuit against a multinational corporation 
asserting that they were injured when the corporation failed to 
supervise its licensees’ labor practices and thereby did not ensure 
compliance with the corporation’s labor standards. The plaintiff 
consumers would request injunctive relief which would require the 
defendant corporation to remedy their current CSR enforcement 
 
161 Id. at 1065. 
162 Id. at 1066–67. 
163 Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36, 46 (Ct. App. 2006). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
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practices, where the failure to do so adequately and promptly could 
result in a loss of the corporation’s exclusive right to their 
trademark. 
While the proposed cause of action will not entirely solve the 
gap in enforceability of CSR codes, the analogies drawn in this 
section will still be relevant and will create another tool in the 
toolkit of potential mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing CSR 
in a way that avoids some of the shortcomings of past and present 
methods. Several obstacles stand in the way of the proposed 
theory’s viability. Four obstacles are most pressing: (1) procedure, 
(2) standing, (3) resistance from corporations, and (4) extending 
quality control to labor standard control. 
A. Procedure 
While the naked licensing doctrine’s current procedural 
mechanism operates only as a defense to an infringement claim,166 
the proposed theory requires two distinct differences: (1) the 
plaintiff will be a consumer or class of consumers, rather than 
another corporation, and (2) the action will be available as an 
independent cause of action, rather than a defense. 
Corporations would be unlikely to initiate a suit against another 
corporation on this theory. Not only does it seem unlikely that a 
corporation would take on the burdens, costs, and risks of litigation 
for the sake of enforcing CSR, but also, even if the potential gain 
to a corporation is a competitor losing the right to their trademark, 
bringing this type of suit creates the potential risk that the plaintiff 
corporation will be exposed for all of its labor practices and/or 
violations. 
Additionally, the theory would not be workable if it could only 
be invoked by defendants to another suit. This procedural 
mechanism would run into the same shortcomings of self-regulated 
CSR codes. If corporations needed to sue suppliers or other 
corporations first, knowing full well that they risk exposing 
themselves to this newly available defense, the suits that trigger the 
defense simply wouldn’t be initiated. 
 
166 Kuss, supra note 50, at 373. 
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Therefore, for this theory to work procedurally, it is imperative 
that the power is left in the hands of consumers, and that the suits 
can be initiated in their own right, not simply as defenses. 
The potential for an extension of naked licensing actions into 
independent lawsuits is not unheard of in the current scheme of the 
law. First, scholars and courts have resisted the application of the 
naked licensing doctrine in its current form because of its 
procedural mechanism and the way that it favors defendants with 
unclean hands.167 Furthermore, the affirmative duty that the 
Lanham Act imposes on licensors to supervise licensees has been 
extended to licensor liability due to misleading or false advertising 
of licensees as well as products’ liability of licensees.168 The 
criticism to the procedure of the doctrine, taken in consideration of 
the other extensions of the affirmative duty, would lend support to 
a potential shift in the implementation of the doctrine that upholds 
the underlying consumer protection policy while shifting the power 
of litigation out of unclean hands and into the hands of injured 
consumers themselves. 
B. Standing 
As aforementioned, three standards must be met for a party to 
have standing: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact 
which is concrete, and particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) 
there must be causation between the injury and the action before 
the court, and (3) it must be likely that a favorable decision by the 
court will redress the injury.169 
Pursuant to prong (1), to establish an injury in fact, courts will 
need to look to false advertising law under the Lanham Act. The 
statue states in relevant part: 
Any person who . . . uses in commerce any word, 
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which— 
 
167 Id. 
168 See supra notes 54–56. 
169 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
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(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, 
or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person . . . 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who 
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged 
by such act.170 
Unfortunately, the current case law is grim as to courts finding 
standing for consumers looking to bring suit under the statute.171 
Rather, courts have found that the statute is reserved exclusively 
“to protect the interests of a purely commercial class against the 
unscrupulous conduct of other commercial entities.”172 
However, a close interpretation of the statute seems to lend 
itself to the potential for an action to be brought by a consumer, 
even if courts have yet to interpret it that way thus far. The statute 
provides further, “as used in this subsection, the term ‘any person’ 
includes any State, instrumentality of a State or employee of a 
State or instrumentality acting in his or her official capacity.”173 
However, even with that explanation it seems unusual that the 
statute uses the word “person,” as opposed to “entity” or 
“organization.”174 Particularly striking is the second mention of the 
word “person,” as it is accompanied by “he or she.”175 The use of 
both the words “he” and “she” seem to suggest that the “person” 
mentioned in the second instance could be an individual, rather 
than a legal entity which may only have been referred to as “it,” 
“she” alone, or “he” alone. Given that a definition is provided in 
 
170 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
171 44 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 (1997) (citing Two Moms and a Toy, LLC v. Int’l 
Playthings, LLC, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2012) (holding plaintiff didn’t have 
standing for a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act because it was not engaged 
in the sale of toys or a competitor of the defendant); Kwaak v. Pfizer, Inc., 881 N.E.2d 
812 (2008) (holding the consumers in a class against a mouthwash company did not 
suffer similar injuries and could not certify as a class)). 
172 Id. 
173 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
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the statute, it will be a hard argument to make, but it is also worth 
noting that the definition itself only uses the word “includes,”176 
and not “includes only” or “shall be limited to.” 
Under the proposed theory of this Note, since it is an extension 
of false advertising and naked licensing, and rooted deeply in the 
underlying policy, the injury in fact will be based on the language 
of the Lanham Act with the assumption that there is room in the 
act to interpret “person” as consumer or class of consumers. 
Once injury in fact is established, the next challenge to 
standing will be causation between the injury and the action before 
the court. To establish causation, the class of consumers would 
have to be a similarly situated class of individuals who made 
purchases based on the notion that the company from which they 
were purchasing had a code of conduct that they upheld with 
regard to their international labor standards, not only within the 
organization but within the web of their supply chain, including 
licensees. The action before the court, under this theory, is the 
failure of a company to control the labor standards of licensees and 
suppliers to ensure compliance with the labor standards that the 
company promulgates on its website and other public relations. 
Causation between that action and the injury can be established if 
consumers make purchase decisions based on the information that 
they are given from the corporation about that corporation’s labor 
standards. 
For example, imagine Consumer A was a fan of the ABC 
sports team. The ABC sports team incorporated their commitment 
to “social responsibility” in much of their advertising. Their code 
of conduct could be found on their website, and their players often 
posted pictures on social media that related to their team’s 
commitment to human rights. This commitment, in fact, is a main 
reason that Consumer A is an ABC fan. Likewise, Consumer A 
invests a lot of time and energy into his fandom, and even invests 
money by purchasing merchandise that bears the ABC logo. The 
purchases make Consumer A feel a strong sense of purpose and 
identity, as the ABC brand identity aligns closely with his own. 
 
176 Id. 
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Later, a feature in the local paper exposes a scandal that many of 
the licensees that ABC uses for its merchandising engage in 
practices that are in direct opposition to what is reflected in ABC’s 
codes of conduct. Consumer A files a lawsuit under the theory 
proposed in this Note, as the injury was caused by ABC’s failure to 
supervise its licensees’ labor standards. The failure to supervise 
was a direct cause of the false advertising, which in turn, was a 
direct cause of Consumer A’s injury. 
Finally, even after causation is established, a plaintiff must 
establish that it is likely that a favorable decision by the court will 
redress the injury. Under the framework of the above example, 
injunctive relief would redress the injury, as an affirmative duty to 
actively supervise the licensees’ labor practices would end the 
false advertising. Further, if supervision does not ensue and the 
corporation loses its trademark, the injury will also be redressed. 
Without a trademark, the consumer will no longer build 
associations with the brand, as the loss of the trademark is a source 
of information, much like the presence of one is meant to be. If a 
registered trademark denotes a certain shared identity across all 
products that incorporate that mark, the lack thereof denotes that 
that consistent identity should not be expected. 
C. Resistance from Corporations 
This theory will undoubtedly be met with substantial scrutiny 
from multinational corporations, as the naked licensing doctrine in 
its current state has already been regarded as too inflexible and in 
turn too burdensome on corporations. Among several arguments, 
corporations will likely assert that the theory imposes a burden that 
is impossible to overcome given the intricate nature of the supply 
chain for multinational corporations. 
However, the duty imposed under this theory will mimic that 
of the naked licensing doctrine as it currently exists. That is, under 
this theory a corporation will have the affirmative duty to supervise 
labor standards, only as far into the supply chain as they are 
required to supervise with regard to quality. In this way, a 
corporation may be hesitant to suggest in court that the affirmative 
duty poses an undue burden, as they may be exposing a failure to 
comply with an already existing affirmative duty to supervise 
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quality. While this limitation to the new proposed duty will leave a 
gap in enforcement, it will create a higher likelihood of compliance 
than if the burden was unduly high and impracticable. 
Additionally, to alleviate some of the pushback, the injunctive 
relief requested under the theory will need to be accompanied with 
some guidance for corporations who either have no supervision 
mechanism in place, or whose mechanism is inadequate. The 
guidance can include coordinating with an existing organization 
like the FLA, to implement a regiment of regular audits. 
D. Extending Quality Control to Labor Standard Control 
The last major challenge that the theory proposed in this Note 
will face is convincing courts to extend the naked licensing 
doctrine’s affirmative duty to supervise licensees for quality 
control to an affirmative duty to supervise licensees for labor 
practices. This extension is imperative because the proposed theory 
only works if it results in an affirmative duty on licensors to 
supervise their licensees for labor standards. 
First, it will be probative to point to actual practices of 
corporations that strongly support a finding that corporations 
themselves are aware that their consumers associate the brands 
with the contents of their CSR codes. Some corporations have 
written codes that, as extensions to their CSR codes, incorporate 
their licensees as bound by the codes.177 Some corporations even 
reserve themselves a right to monitor practices and terminate 
business relationships that do not meet their standards.178 Further, 
 
177 See, e.g., Licensee and Supplier Code of Conduct, NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N (Oct. 
30, 2017, 8:52 AM), http://www.nba.com/nbap-code-of-conduct [https://perma.cc/67LF-
UP2N] (“In keeping with this mission, NBA Properties, Inc. (“NBAP”) is committed to 
conducting its business in a socially responsible and ethical manner. We expect all NBAP 
licensees, including their contractors, engaged in the manufacture and sourcing of 
products bearing NBA, WNBA, NBDL and USA Basketball (collectively “Product 
Suppliers”) to share this commitment. At a minimum, all Product Suppliers must adhere 
to the following Licensee and Supplier Code of Conduct . . . .”). 
178 See Global Business Ethics Principles, supra note 95 (“Monitoring and Right to 
Terminate - Hasbro shall have the right to conduct periodic on-site visits of working and 
living conditions, including unannounced audits of production records and practices and 
of wage, hour and payroll information maintained by Facilities, to review and ensure 
compliance with the Principles. Hasbro retains the right, in its sole discretion, to 
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some codes make specific reference to their aim towards 
consumers; Hasbro, for example, notes in its code that it “wants its 
consumers to have confidence that products manufactured by 
Hasbro, or its vendors, suppliers and licensees, are produced in 
accordance with the principles set forth herein and are not made 
under inhumane or exploitative conditions.”179 
This language supports the finding that Hasbro is aware that 
their consumers rely, at least in part, on the information in the 
code, which they use to be confident of the types of labor practices 
that can be assumed to occur when purchasing a product bearing a 
Hasbro trademark (whether directly from Hasbro, or from a 
licensee). This provides us with the information that the risk for 
consumer deception is implicated when a CSR code is not 
complied with, and would support a finding that a licensed product 
bearing a trademark that had associated with it fair labor practices 
could run the risk of being “nakedly licensed” if the licensees’ 
labor practices were not monitored and supervised, in compliance 
with a written code or otherwise. 
Additionally, when looked at through the lens of the Ninth 
Circuit’s factors for what constitutes naked licensing, the 
contractual obligation, or the words of the code of conduct, cannot 
alone be enough to absolve a company of liability under this new 
theory. To satisfy the affirmative duty to supervise, in addition to a 
contractual obligation, actual supervision must take place.180 
Remembering that the naked licensing doctrine is rooted in 
consumer protection, an extension of the affirmative duty in a way 
that further protects consumers seems natural. As mentioned, the 
affirmative duty stems from the concept that consumers use 
trademarks as a source of information. Consumers relate 
trademarks to brands, which can be extensive identities almost like 
 
terminate its relationship with a vendor, supplier or licensee facility in violation of the 
Principles; however, Hasbro will endeavor to work with Facilities to promptly address 
any problems discovered in the course of its review or audit. Hasbro will require the 
implementation of an acceptable written corrective action plan for any problems found 
during an audit. Failure to address items in the corrective action plan may result in 
termination of the business relationship.”). 
179 Id. 
180 See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 18:56. 
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those of humans.181 The connections that consumers draw to their 
chosen brands is strong, and the full brand identity is associated 
with a company’s registered trademark. It is a reasonable leap to 
find that just as a consumer will associate a trademark with a 
certain quality, a consumer will also associate a trademark with 
certain human rights standards that that trademark has established 
itself to encompass. If companies can license their trademark, and 
with it their brand, without retaining or exercising any control over 
their licensees to ensure that all the elements of their brand identity 
are being upheld, then the risk of consumer deception will be high. 
Finally, for the proposed theory to be viable, it is imperative 
that an affirmative duty works in conjunction with the false 
advertising component of the theory. One of Nike’s major defenses 
in Kasky was that even if the statements they made regarding their 
labor practices were actionable, the plaintiffs would be held to the 
New York Times Co v. Sullivan standard, in which case they would 
need to “prove that Nike’s statements were made with knowledge 
of falsity, or with reckless disregard for truth or falsity.”182 While 
this standard would introduce an insurmountable burden on the 
plaintiff consumers in a pure false advertising action, it might not 
be insurmountable if Nike’s affirmative duty to monitor and 
supervise its licensees under the naked licensing doctrine was 
invoked. If a court found that there was in fact an affirmative duty 
to monitor, then proving at the very least “reckless disregard for 
truth or falsity” would be substantially more plausible, because the 
burden would then shift back to Nike to present the evidence 
pertaining to their monitoring practices. If Nike was unable to do 
that, they would be admitting not only to a failure to supervise, but 
also to a reckless disregard to the falsity of their statements that 
would satisfy even the high burden of New York Times. It is 
therefore an essential feature of the theory that it is built on the 
policy behind the Lanham Act, and it allows both the naked 
licensing doctrine and false advertising laws to work together. 
 
181 Hess, supra note 8. 
182 Vladeck, supra note 141, at 1061. 
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CONCLUSION 
Brands are powerful and multinational corporations own 
exceedingly lucrative trademarks that signify all of the associations 
consumers make with their brands. For many multinational 
corporations, a commitment to fair labor standards throughout the 
supply chain is a core feature of their brand’s image. In turn, 
consumers rely on the information they are given from 
multinational corporations when creating brand images and 
making purchase decisions. If corporations use their commitment 
to fair labor as a facet of their branding strategy, then they must be 
held accountable to ensure that what they espouse is true, in order 
to uphold the consumer protection policy behind the Lanham Act. 
With the proposed cause of action, consumers will be able to 
differentiate between the genuinely socially responsible brands and 
those providing misleading or incomplete information on their 
labor practices, amongst the thousands of brands they are 
confronted with daily. 
